Data is the Foundation of JADC2, and We Need Allies and Partners “Built In”
(This is the second in a series on the capabilities and approaches US, allies, and partners need to achieve the security vision described in the 2018 NDS.)
We shape, deter, and fight as coalitions, and to be effective in coalition operations, we need to design “interoperability” with allies and partners into our command and control systems. At its foundation, interoperability is about our ability to share information with allies and partners at all levels in order to execute the intent of our political leaders according to political-level agreements. As we design Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) as the baseline for future coalition operations, this article outlines the importance of data as the foundation of interoperability in modern command and control (C2), and highlights the need to build allies and partners into that data-centric baseline.
Interoperability is “the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives” (Joint Publication 3–0). The capabilities needed for forces to be interoperable have evolved over time, from procuring the right platforms then training together, to sharing increasing amounts of data over common networks. Sharing data allows coalitions to achieve high levels of shared understanding, such as through a Common Operating Picture (COP), which is the basis for combined C2 and tactical execution of agreed operational contracts between partners.
Industrial-Age Interoperability. In previous conflicts, interoperability with allies and partners was based on having the right secure phones, radio frequencies, fuel mixtures, and bullet compatibility. This level of interoperability led to effective C2 of combined forces in DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, and IRAQI FREEDOM at an industrial-age model.
Information-Age Interoperability. In an information-age model, U.S., allied, and partner forces share large amounts of data machine-to-machine over networks to link sensors, platforms, and C2. Software tools including AI-enabled tools operate to identify adversary presence and activity in all domains, and coalition C2 operates at each echelon of command on a common operating picture that represents shared understanding. Data is the primary asset, and data is shared and stored at echelons of command to enable mission command and independent operations during periods of network attack. This data-centric information-age model is currently being developed by U.S. military services as “JADC2” to optimize functionality and interoperability.
Currently, U.S.-led coalitions operate in a hybrid state of transition between industrial-age and information-age models. Today, U.S., ally, and partner forces executing coalition operations tie sensors and platforms together through sharing data and track files over tactical data links like Link 16. These networks provide effective information-sharing of smaller packages of information that include the locations and identifications of friendly and enemy forces, packets of intelligence information, and directives from C2. In many regions, most of the data used for C2 already originates from allied and partner contributions, and regional component leaders are actively working to increase allied and partner data integration to an information-age model.
Information-Age Interoperability is Built on Data. While service leaders have highlighted the importance of networks to build JADC2, to design for interoperability, we need to focus on the interoperability of U.S., allied, and partner data. Information-age interoperability depends on building allies and partners into our data architecture, rather than bolting them on afterward. While partners can be integrated via “built-in” or “bolted-on” data infrastructures, “building-in” allies and partners maximizes the data available and speed of access, which is needed for applications like hypersonic defense. “Buiding-in” allies and partners also allows JADC2 designers to lead-turn policy issues affecting where data will be stored, including understanding partner’s sovereign data policy and giving partners the ability to shape their policy to improve outcomes. Incorporating partners maximizes data-sharing among allies and partners, while still protecting sovereign data and sharing according to sovereign caveats.
Architecture. Integrating allies and partners into JADC2 means designing tiered storage and access controls that fully integrate ally and partner data at all levels of operation. Tiered Storage of data places mission-essential data in a tiered structure at each echelon of command to enable U.S., ally, and partner coalition operations under the C2 concept of mission command, where each command echelon has the authorities and data needed to execute the commander’s intent. Data at echelon includes data stored in cloud environments as well as data pushed forward to enable mission command of tactical-level operations when cut off from operational-level and strategic-level data.
Integration of allied and partner data will also depend on implementing access controls that allow partners to define who accesses their sovereign data. For example, country A may agree to share the data with only the U.S. and country B. Access controls built into the architecture must guarantee that although country C is integrated into the same network, country C does not get data provided by country B. By the U.S. defining our architecture and interfaces, partners can design their architecture and interfaces to match the U.S. approach, to maximize interoperability of fielded systems and forces.
To fully leverage available data needed for defense, we need to build allies and partners into our future JADC2 network and data infrastructure from the outset to maximize interoperability. Rapid development of Integrated Air and Missile Defense capabilities in the Middle East and Europe offer significant opportunities to define and implement the future network and data architectures that fuse allies and partners for the highest levels of interoperability.
For further reading, other articles in this series include Interoperability and Interdependence, and three articles on IAMD including rapid evolution of threats, the need to adopt a comprehensive IAMD approach, and challenges with Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
