IAMD 2020, Article 1: Threats and Overview
(This is the first in a series of three articles on shifts shaping Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) in 2020, a significant area of opportunity and growth. Rapid threat development in 2019, including advances in mid-sized Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) by Iranian proxies demonstrated during the 14 September Saudi Aramco attack, are driving significant investment in IAMD and command and control (C2) architectures around the world. This three-part series addresses IAMD growth, partner requirements, and opportunities.)
On 14 September 2019, a coordinated attack by over 19 air vehicles against Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq oil processing facility temporarily destroyed 5% of the world’s oil production capacity and drove immediate changes in world oil markets and regional political dynamics. This attack illuminated advances in mid-sized Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) by Iran and Iranian-associated proxy groups that had been progressing for over a year, and also highlighted lessons for defensive systems designed to protect against similar attacks. These factors are driving significant investment in IAMD systems and C2 architectures around the world. This is the first article in a three-part series on IAMD that addresses threat evolution and provides an overview of the IAMD capabilities needed to counter threat developments.
Threat advancements. Air and missile threats affecting the Middle East rapidly advanced in 2019, and now include long-range, mid-sized (Group-3) fixed-wing UAS. In 2016, ISIS weaponized small commercially-produced quadcopters to drop small 40-mm grenades on targets within several kilometers of their launch location. The rapid development of this threat in Iraq and Syria drove U.S. development of local base-defense electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, barrel-launched systems for force protection, and improved battle drills for local defenses.
While ISIS focused on weaponizing quadcopters, Iran and its proxies developed longer-range fixed-wing capabilities to extend their reach in the region. The 10 January 2019 Houthi attack on a Yemeni military parade at Anad air base near Aden, which killed 6 people including the head of Yemeni intelligence, demonstrated effective Houthi intelligence-gathering, precision engagement, and C2 capabilities needed to conduct trigger-based attacks. As a result of these Iranian-associated advancements, threats from unmanned systems have now expanded to include larger fixed-wing systems with longer ranges, greater payloads, and effective planning and guidance systems that provide attackers the ability to reliably deliver long-range precision strikes. These mid-sized Group-3 systems are also accessible at low costs, and are easy to produce and operate. The net effect of these increased threat capabilities is greater demand on the IAMD systems that defend against them, and for regional integration of national IAMD architectures.
The 14 September Aramco attack also highlighted new lessons for IAMD systems designed to prevent similar attacks. Regional partners procured and deployed capable IAMD systems such as Patriot, long range surveillance radars, and C2 systems, but in this case were unable to effectively defend against the attack. To improve defenses, partners will need to improve integration of these systems, increase regional information-sharing, and improve C2 to tie systems and architectures together.
Integration. First, to improve defenses, IAMD systems need to be better integrated, which involves improving networks and data interchange between systems. “Integration” used to be about partners buying compatible systems and training together. Now, effective IAMD integration demands that systems operate on a common network to share increasing amounts of data using common standards. The first echelon of systems integration involves sharing track-files, which are packages of fully synthesized information that IAMD systems need for target engagement. However, while sharing track-files has been effective in the past, IAMD systems now need to progress to sharing system-level data to improve detection and track quality against lower-cross-section threats and maneuvering threats, improve defenses against electronic attack, and improve system resilience. Increasing data sharing will also facilitate the operation of Artificial Intelligence tools to enhance detection and C2. To summarize, effective IAMD integration can be characterized by integrating a layered pyramid of networks, data, sensors, platforms, and C2.
To improve defenses, partners will also need to increase regional information-sharing. Just as tying IAMD systems together improves overall performance, linking national architectures together to share data improves the threat detection and track quality for all national systems involved. Improving data-sharing increases IAMD effectiveness against threats that attempt to hide using natural terrain and national boundaries, lower-cross-section threats, swarm attacks that use diverse ingress routes, maneuvering threats, and adversary use of electronic attack. Multinational integration also improves IAMD system resilience in the event of effective attacks by increasing redundancy in surveillance sensors that generate the overall air picture. Tying networks together and sharing data requires establishing effective network standards and security, such as the U.S. government Risk Management Framework (RMF) to for physical, electronic, and procedural protection against cyber-security threats. The net effect of increased regional information-sharing is increased performance for all national IAMD systems that participate.
Command and Control (C2). Finally, to improve defenses, partners will need to improve their ability to command and control integrated air and missile defenses. The U.S. military operates according to doctrine that establishes IAMD unity of command under an Area Air Defense Commander, or AADC. The AADC plans, coordinates, and integrates overall joint force air and missile defense operations. The Joint Force Commander normally designates the AADC as the component commander with the preponderance of air and missile defense capability, and the ability to C2 those forces. Similarly, to improve IAMD performance, partners will need to unify their national IAMD C2 under a single national AADC and develop unified national C2 systems to execute effective defense. Beyond national C2, regional C2 systems need to be developed that effectively integrate national IAMD systems into a common multilateral architecture, according to political agreements among participating nations. Taken together, increased C2 integration will improve IAMD performance by improving detection and layering engagement capabilities for all participating nations.
Evolutions in threat systems capabilities in 2019, especially the introduction of effective mid-size long-range precision attack UAS, require increased IAMD capabilities for effective defense. As our partners strengthen their defenses in 2020, partners need to improve IAMD systems integration, increase regional information-sharing, and grow C2 to tie systems and architectures together. Collectively, increased system integration and collaboration by partners will provide the most effective defense against new threat systems.
(This was the first in a series of three articles on major shifts shaping Integrated Air and Missile Defense. The next article will describe the elements of a comprehensive Integrated Air and Missile Defense approach needed to defend against future threats.)
